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Abstract
Fink, Mattoo, and Rathindran  analyze  the effect of  The authors find that both privatization  and
policy reform  in basic telecommunications  on sectoral  competition lead  to significant improvements  in
performance  using a new panel  data set for 86  performance.  But a comprehensive  reform program,
developing countries across Africa,  Asia, the Middle East,  involving both  policies and the support of an
and Latin America and the Caribbean  over the period  independent regulator, produced  the largest gains-an
1985 to  1999.  The authors address  three questions:  8 percent higher level  of mainlines and a 21  percent
o  What impact do specific  policy changes-relating  to  higher level  of productivity compared to years of partial
ownership and competition-have  on sectoral  and no  reform. Interestingly, the sequence of reform
performance?  matters:  mainline  penetration  is lower if competition  is
o How is the impact of change  in any one policy  introduced  after privatization,  rather than at the same
affected by the implementation  of the other, and by the  time. The authors also find that autonomous  factors,
overall  regulatory framework?  such  as technological  progress,  have a strong  influence
- Does the sequence  in which reforms are  on telecommunications  performance,  accounting  for an
implemented affect  performance?  increase of 5  percent a year in teledensity  and  9 percent
in productivity  over the period 1985  to  1999.
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The dynamism of global telecommunications markets is widely attributed to rapid technological
development and an increasingly  liberal policy environment.  Over the past decade, a large
number of developing economies have embarked on reform paths, and witnessed significant
expansion of their telecommunications  networks and striking improvements in productivity.'
Over the period 1985-1999, mainline penetration and productivity in developing countries more
than tripled.  But neither performance  nor policy was uniform within or across regions.  For
example, while mainline penetration in Sri Lanka increased more than five-fold, Malawi saw a
more modest 40% increase.  It is not obvious where the improved performance is because of
specific policy choices rather than in spite of them, and where more could have been achieved
had policy been different.
Telecommunications  liberalization  is a complex and relatively new process for developing
countries.  Choices have to be made regarding the privatization of state-owned
telecommunications  operators, the introduction of competition, the opening of markets to foreign
investment and the establishment of pro-competitive regulations.  While there is growing
consensus that each of these elements is desirable, it is a rare country that has immediately gone
all the way on all fronts.  In general, governments  have differed in their willingness to concede
control to the market,  and most have a penchant for gradualism.  Competition has been
introduced, but the number of firms has been fixed by policy; privatization is often partial and
there are limits on foreign participation;  "autonomous" regulators have been created but are
rarely fully independent.2
This paper has a dual purpose.  First, to introduce  a new data set for 86 developing countries on
telecommunications  policy (described  in Appendix  1).3  Second, to analyze the impact of
telecom policy on telecom  sector performance.  We address three questions. First, what impact
do specific policy changes - relating to ownership, competition and regulation - have on sectoral
performance?  Second, how is the impact of any one policy change affected by the
implementation of complementary reforms?  Third, does the sequence in which reforms are
implemented affect performance?
There are several recent cross-country econometric  studies examining the effect of
telecommunications  reform on sector performance.4 Wallsten (2001), Ros (1999),  Li and Xu
Substantial reform  has also taken place in  Eastern Europe.  However, this study focuses on developing countries
where network development was much more limited.
2  Noll (2000) sets forth  the problems of telecommunications  policy reform  and analyzes the same within the
historical, economic and political context of developing countries.
3 The "newness"  of our data refers to the fact that we have information on competition in  the local fixed line
segment, the analogue mobile segment, and the digital mobile segment for 86 countries until  1999. Further, we also
have data on strategic foreign equity in  the incumbent  fixed-line operator.
4 There have also been studies that examine the link between telephone density (or teledensity) and economic
development. For example,  Jipp (1963)  first brought to light the strong correlation  between teledensity and the level
of GDP per-capita.  Further, there are recent studies that look at the relationship  between telecom liberalization and
macroeconomic performance.  See, for example, Roller and Waverman  (2001)  & Mattoo et.  al. (2001).
2(2001) explore the effects of reforms such as privatization, competition and regulation  on several
performance indicators, using panel data. While the results broadly indicate that liberalization of
the sector improves performance,  different country samples and estimation techniques lead to
differing conclusions about the effects of specific policies.
Our empirical investigation improves upon existing studies in several ways.  First, we explore
not only individual and interactive effects of policy choices, but also whether the sequencing of
privatization and competition affects performance.  This latter dimension of telecommunications
reform has not been analyzed before.  Second, we explicitly allow for the fact that, aside from
policy reforms, autonomous technological advances  drove improvements in telecommunications
performance in recent years.  We quantify the relative importance of autonomous and policy-
induced improvements  in sector performance.  Third, we use more comprehensive data on policy
and regulation than previous  studies.  Our panel spans the years 1985-1999  and thus captures a
large number of reform initiatives in developing countries that occurred in the second half of the
1990s.  Fourth, our competition variable directly reflects competition in the local market
segment, which we believe is the most relevant influence on teledensity and telecommunications
productivity.  Furthermore, we are also able to distinguish competition in the fixed line sector
from mobile competition and control for the endogenous effect of the competing network while
explaining  sectoral performance.  Finally, our estimates control for the problems of serial
correlation and panel-level heteroscedasticity,  which were not addressed by previous studies.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes  the pattern of both
telecommunications  policy and performance in the developing world.  Section III presents a
conceptual framework to analyze the impact of reforms on performance building upon the
existing literature on the subject.  The estimation methodology and results are presented in
section IV.  Concluding remarks are presented in Section V.
II.  Telecommunications  performance and policy in developing  countries
Over the  1985-1999 period, mainline penetration  in all developing countries tripled from 2.4
telephone mainlines per  100 people to 7.27 mainlines per 100 (Figure  la).6 Productivity showed
an even more impressive trend, rising from 27.2 mainlines per worker in  1985 to 91.2 mainlines
per worker in 1999 (Figure  1  b):
5 See Wallsten (2001)  and Ros (1999).
6 From here on, we use the terms "teledensity",  "fixed-line  teledensity", "mainlines  per 100", and "mainline
penetration"  interchangeably.
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There is, however,  considerable variation in performance  across regions.  Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) and Asia had comparable  levels of teledensity in 1985 (around 1 mainline per  100), but by
1999, Asia witnessed nearly a five-fold increase while SSA only experienced a three-fold
increase.  Similarly, Latin American and Caribbean (LAC), and the Middle Eastern and North
African (MENA)  countries started from comparable  levels of around 5 mainlines per 100 in
1985, but while mainline penetration nearly trebled in the LAC region, the MENA region
witnessed only around a two-fold increase.  The comparative performance of Asia and the LAC
region in terms of telecommunications  productivity was even more impressive.
The pattern of policy reform adoption is equally diverse.  In 1985, privatization was rare  in the
developing  world. However, by 1999, one-quarter of SSA countries, about half of the Asian
countries,  and two-thirds of the LAC countries in our samnple had at least partially privatized
their incumbent phone operators (Figure 2a). The United Arab Emirates was the sole country
among the MENA countries in our sample to have private ownership of the incumbent over the
1985-1999 period.  Asian and MENA countries have been the most reluctant to allow foreign
equity participation in their incumbent phone operators,  but many SSA and LAC countries have
been more permissive  in this respect (Figure  2b).
In 1990, no country in our sample had licensed a second operator in competition with the
incumbent local services provider.  By 1999, two-fifths  of Asian and LAC countries had
introduced some form of competition in local services, while less than one-fifth of SSA countries
had done so (Figure 2c). None of the MENA states had licensed a second local fixed line
operator over our sample period of 1985 to 1999. In 1985, independent  regulators were rare,
whereas by 1999, half of the Asian and SSA countries,  one-third of MENA countries and three-
quarters of the LAC  countries had independent regulators (Figure 2d).
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Mobile telecommunications in developing countries
A truly remarkable  feature of telecommunications performance  in developing countries over the
1  990s has been the widespread diffusion of mobile telephony.  In  1985, most developing
countries had virtually no mobile telephony.  By  1999, a number of countries,  e.g. Cambodia,
Cote d'Ivoire, Paraguay, Uganda and Venezuela,  had more mobile subscribers than fixed-line
subscribers (I.T.U.,  2000).  Interestingly,  the MENA region leads the developing  world in mobile
penetration (at 6.8 mobile subscribers per 100 people), followed  by LAC (6.3), Asia (2.4) and
SSA (1.7).
Unlike fixed-line services, the mobile telephony segment was often subject to competition in its
infancy.  By 1999, more than 90% of the Asian economies in our sample had more than one
cellular operator. The MENA countries have been the most reluctant to introduce mobile
competition,  with only 30% having done so by the end of 1999. About half the SSA and LAC
countries in our sample had licensed a second mobile operator by 1999.
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HI. Conceptual framework
Our objective is to find a relationship, if any, between these diverse patterns of policy and
performance.  Three dimensions of policy are relevant:  a change of ownership,  introduction of
competition,  and strengthened  regulation.  Performance  itself is generally seen as having two
dimensions:  internal efficiency within firms and allocative efficiency  in the market.  In order to
generate testable hypotheses,  we link the conceptual  discussion in this section to two proxy
variables.  Our proxy for internal efficiency is labor productivity - measured by the number of
mainlines per employee.  Since we do not have the data to measure price-cost wedges, we use
the aggregate-output - measured by the number of main lines - as a crude proxy for allocative
efficiency.  We are aware that each of these proxies is imperfect.  For instance,  internal
efficiency is better measured by total factor productivity,  and output may be a deceptive measure
of allocative efficiency because,  for example, there could be an excessive  expansion of the
network.  Nevertheless, these two measures are the ones that can be computed most easily with
available data and with the smallest measurement  error.
Privatization involves the transfer from public to private hands of the ownership of productive
assets, the right to take allocative decisions and the entitlement  to the residual profit flows.
Earlier analyses emphasized the impact of the resulting change in objectives:  from the
maximization of social welfare to the maximization of profit.  The implication was that with a
concentrated market structure, public ownership  was more likely to promote allocative efficiency
than private ownership  - where the temptation would be to restrict output to maximize  profits.
7  For a discussion of these issues, see Shapiro and Willig (1990).
6More recent analyses of the impact of a change of ownership have focused on the change in the
incentives for the firm's management.8 Changes in performance  are attributed to changes in the
principal-agent  relationship between the firm's management  (the agent) and either private
shareholders or the government or ultimately the general public (the alternative principals).
Private ownership is likely to lead to greater internal efficiency  for a variety of reasons,  ranging
from lower costs of monitoring, more precise and measurable targets and greater flexibility to
devise incentive contracts.
In some ways, the traditional and more recent analyses are complementary.  The general
prediction would be that a change of ownership from public to private (or foreign) hands would
improve internal efficiency.9 The presumption of a positive impact on the chosen proxy, labor
productivity,  is even greater because public enterprises  may seek to meet social or political
objectives by creating excessive  employment.  The impact on the measure of allocative
efficiency, the number of mainlines, is less obvious.  Increased internal efficiency due to
privatization would favor an expansion, but the greater emphasis  on private profitability may
dampen the effect.'0 However, the impact may still be positive if the public provider is resource-
constrained in a way that the private (or foreign) provider is not - e.g. because the latter has
better access to the capital market.  Therefore,  we have:
Hypothesis 1:  Privatization leads to an increase in labor productivity.  There is a weaker
presumption that it will lead to an increase  in the number of mainlines.
The results of increased  competition would seem to be relatively straightforward,  as it promotes
both allocative efficiency and internal  efficiency. 1  l  Firmns,  private or public, must produce
efficiently in order to survive, and there is less scope for monopolistic restraint on output.'2
There is, however, a twist.  In some cases, public monopolies have sought to expand networks
through a system of cross-subsidization  - using revenues from segments like urban areas or
international calls, to extend services to poorer areas or consumers.  The introduction of
competition may threaten these arrangements.  This possibility introduces an element of
ambiguity to the relationship between increased competition and the expansion in the number of
mainlines.  On balance  we have:
Hypothesis 2:  The introduction of local fixed-line competition will lead to an increase in
productivity.  There is a weaker presumption that it will lead to an increase in the number
of mainlines.
The impact of individual policy changes may be modified when they are implemented in
conjunction with other policy changes.  Consider first the interaction between privatization and
competition.  If a public monopoly is privatized, the introduction of competition helps eliminate
8 See, e.g. Levy and Spiller (1996).
9 Foreign ownership may also be associated  with the transfer of improved technology.
° The latter negative effect may in turn be diluted by the existence of positive network externalities.
1  "Vickers  and Yarrow (1988).
12 Competition also makes it easier to monitor managerial performance - e.g.,  by diluting the management's
monopoly of information.
7the remaining scope for managerial slack and the monopolistic incentive.to restrict output.'3 At
the same time, privatization of a public monopoly renders the introduction of competition more
credible and less distorted by eliminating the government's incentive to favor the public
provider. 1  We would therefore expect the interaction of privatization and competition to have a
positive impact on both internal and allocative efficiency,  subject to the qualifications noted
above.  Furthermore,  in so far as mobile telephony is a substitute for fixed line telephony, mobile
competition could serve as a surrogate for fixed line competition.  So we test:
Hypothesis 3:  The interaction of privatization and fixed-line competition will lead to an
increase in productivity and the number of mainlines.  The interaction of privatization
and mobile competition may also have the same effect.
The most critical complementary policy change is in the regulatory framework.  In the case of
basic telecommunications,  regulation can play at least two roles.15 First, if for any reason the
market structure is not competitive,  then regulation of behavior in the output market (e.g. by
fixing consumer prices) can help simulate a more competitive outcome.  In this sense, regulation
can function as an imperfect substitute for competition when a public monopoly is privatized.
Second, since the incumbent operator invariably controls access to essential facilities,  i.e. the
network, regulation of the terms of access to the network for entrants is necessary to deliver
competition.  Effective interconnection regulation must, therefore, be seen as a precondition for
the emergence of meaningful competition.  For these reasons, we would expect the interaction of
effective regulation with both privatization and the introduction of competition to have a positive
effect on performance.
There is, however, one qualification.  There is invariably a conflict between the regulatory
objectives of ensuring competitive outcomes and access at any one point of time, and creating
adequate incentives for cost-reduction and network expansion over time.  Consider a simple
example.  A regulatory mechanism that sets prices equal to, say, average costs at every point of
time encourages  allocative efficiency but eliminates the firm's incentives  to reduce costs.
Conversely, a regulatory  mechanism that sets prices for a certain length of time allows firms to
reap the benefits of, and hence provides incentives  for, cost-reductions, but at the expense of
allocative  efficiency.  Therefore, the relationship between regulation and performance is more
complex,  and requires a more detailed analysis of the nature of regulation than available data
permits.  Nevertheless, assuming that existing regulatory  arrangements generally strike an
appropriate balance between the two objectives,  we would suggest:
Hypothesis 4:  The interaction of regulation with privatization and competition leads to
an increase  in labor productivity and the number of mainlines.
Finally, consider the implications of alternative sequences of reform involving, in particular,
privatization  and competition.  There are several reasons why it may matter if privatization
3  Armstrong, Cowan  and Vickers (1994).
14  See e.g. Fershtman  (1989).  De Fraja (1991)  arrives at an opposite conclusion.  In a theoretical  model of Coumot
oligopoly, it is shown that the continued presence  of a welfare-maximizing public firm can impose added
competitive pressure on private firms.
5 See e.g. Laffont,  Rey, Tirole (1998).
8precedes the introduction of competition,  essentially because conditions of "competition"  may be
affected.  First of all, the importance of location-specific  sunk costs in basic telecommunications,
suggests that allowing one provider privileged access may have durable consequences.' 6 Sunk
costs matter because they have commitment value and can be used strategically  by those who are
allowed to enter the market first.  The commitment value is stronger the more slowly capital
depreciates and the more specific it is to the firm.  In general, if one firm is allowed to enter the
market early, then this incumbent may accumulate a quantity of "capital"  sufficient to limit, or
modify the conditions of, entry of other firms.'7
Because of the importance of sunk costs, sequential entry can produce very different results from
simultaneous entry.  A market outcome where one firm enters first is not necessarily worse than
one where all firms enter at the same time, but it may well be for several reasons.  First, if entry
is costly, then the incumbent may be able to completely deter entry so that the.outcome is a much
more concentrated  market structure.'8 Second, the first-mover advantage may be conferred on
an inferior (national) supplier who may nevertheless use it to establish a position of market
dominance.  How durable such a position is depends on the degree of cost or quality advantage
more efficient firms have.' 9
A second reason that sequences matter has to do with political economy.  Allowing privileged
access creates vested interests that may then resist further reform or seek to dilute its impact.
The South African experience  provides an example.20 Private shareholders  in the incumbent
(national and foreign) successfully lobbied to reduce the number of entrants that the government
was planning to allow from two to one.21
Finally,  sequences matter because of the implied changes in the regulatory  environment.
Consider the prospects of new entry in two alternative  situations that arise depending on whether
privatization follows or precedes the introduction of competition.  In the former case, the
16  See Bos and Nett (1990).
'7 Capital need not necessarily take a physical form.  A firm may be able to develop a clientele though advertising
and promotional campaigns that pre-empt demand.  The more imperfect the consumers information and the more
important the costs of switching suppliers, the greater the clientele effect.  Consumers  are often reluctant to switch
telecommunications  suppliers even when new entrants  offer better terms.  Each of these forms of "capital
accumulation" enhances the first-mover advantages  and allows the established  firms to restrict or prevent
competition.
18  In situations of network externalities,  entry deterrence  could also be through the choice of a standard that is
incompatible with that of potential entrants.
9 Two qualifications to this argument are important.  First, entry by the more efficient  firm could take place through
acquisition  circumventing some of the problems of first-mover advantage.  But this would require no asymmetry of
information about the value of assets and no direct costs of transferring assets.  Secondly,  incumbents could learn by
doing:  the experience acquired by the established firms during the previous period reduces their current costs,
enhancing their competitiveness  and discourages others from entering.  This form of entry deterrence may well
promote welfare.
20 Lamont (2001).
21  While we are emphasizing the political economic implications  of sequencing, there are also important strategic
considerations.  For instance, Perotti (1995)  argues that one reason we observe partial privatizations  is because of
the government's  inability to credibly commit to non-interference  after the transfer of ownership takes place.
9incumbent is a relative inefficient public operator and the regulator is well informed about the
cost structure.  In the latter case, the incumbent is a relatively efficient private operator and the
regulator is less well informed about the cost structure.  It could be argued that new entry is
easier to accomplish  in the former situation.
While there are good reasons to believe that the sequence matters, it is not easy to predict the
impact of alternative  sequences.  First, any differences  in internal efficiency  may not persist once
each of the sequences  is complete.  Thus, delaying the introduction of competition would allow
the privatized monopoly a period of slack, but once competition is introduced,  the incumbent
would be forced to improve performance rapidly and so there is no reason to presume continued
differences  in-levels of productivity.  As far as allocative efficiency (or its present proxy,
mainlines) is concerned,  allowing entry sequentially rather than simultaneously could lead to an
inferior outcome.  This could happen if sunk costs are so high that new entry is blocked with the
monopolist  incumbent producing  an output lower than the output produced by, say, two firms
that enter simultaneously.  But this is not necessarily the case, because in some cases strategic
behavior by the incumbent could lead to a large expansion of output.22 The implications of
alternative  sequences is therefore  an interesting empirical question.  We test:
Hypothesis 5:  Alternative sequences of reform do not have any impact on internal
efficiency but matter for allocative efficiency.  In particular,  the number of mainlines
created will be lower if privatization takes place before the introduction of competition,
rather than after or at the same time.
While our main hypothesis pertains to the introduction of competition in fixed line services, we
consider also the implications of sequences where mobile competition is introduced prior to
fixed competition.
IV.  Econometric investigation
In this section, we econometrically test the above hypotheses using the data described in
Appendix  1 on 86 developing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, MENA and LAC for the
period 1985-1999.
A limitation of an econometric  investigation is that available measures of policy do not capture
the multiple dimensions of a complex reform process.  For example,  the mere issuing of
additional licenses in a particular service segment is an imperfect indicator of effective
competition-let alone the contestability of markets.  Similarly, while the existence of a separate
regulatory agency indicates that a government is willing to commit to pro-competitive  regulatory
principles,  a regulator can be ineffective if key regulatory responsibilities (e.g., interconnection)
fall outside its mandate.  Moreover, the overall credibility of a government's reform program is
not adequately  captured by our policy proxies, but is likely to exert an important influence on
investment decisions by domestic and foreign firms.  These reservations notwithstanding,  an
22 For instance, the aggregate output in a Stackelberg oligopoly  equilibrium, where one firm has a first-mover
advantage, need not be lower than in a Coumot equilibrium, where all firms make output decisions  simultaneously
(Tirole,  1988).
10econometric  investigation is attractive because it enables a rigorous analysis of the implications
of specific policies and their interaction, controlling for other country-specific  influences.
Previous literature
Before presenting our model, we briefly describe some existing econometric work analyzing the
link between telecommunications  policy and performance.23 Wallsten (2001) explores the effects
of privatization, competition and regulation  on several performance  indicators, using a panel
dataset for 30 African and Latin American countries from  1984-1997.  While competition is
generally found to have a positive effect on performance, the impact of privatization  is mixed.  A
weakness of Wallsten's study is that it approximates the degree of competition in fixed-line
telecommunications  by the number of mobile operators  not owned by the incumbent operator.  In
our view, this is inadequate because many countries have introduced competition in mobile
services while maintaining a monopoly in fixed-line services.
The study by Ros (1999) examines the effects of privatization and competition on network
expansion and efficiency  on the basis of data for 1  10 countries from 1986-1995.  Using fixed
effects estimation, he finds that countries that allowed majority private ownership in their
incumbent telecom operator had significantly higher teledensity (mainline penetration)  and a
higher growth rate in teledensity.24 Allowing a majority private stake in the incumbent was also
found to improve efficiency (telephone mainlines per employee). By contrast, competition in at
least one fixed line market segment (local, long distance, international) did not significantly
affect mainline penetration,  but impacted positively on efficiency.25 Ros however, interprets the
telecom regime to be competitive as long as any one of the basic services segments (local, long
distance, or international)  is competitive.  This is misleading as the most direct influence on
mainline penetration is exerted by local competition.  Furthermore, the sample period misses out
on several episodes of telecommunications  reforms during the late 90s.
Li and Xu (2001) look at the impact of liberalization  on telecommunications  sector performance
using a sample of 160 countries for the analysis of the effects of privatization,  and a smaller
sample of 40 countries for the analysis of the effects of competition. They find that privatization
significantly increases teledensity and telecom productivity.  Their competition variable is an
index measuring the extent of competition in both the fixed and mobile sectors, which is not
significantly correlated with higher mainline penetration.  They find that once fixed line and
mobile competition is controlled for, privatization no longer has a significant  impact on mainline
23  Refer appendix 2 for an overview of the empirical literature on fixed line telephony.
24 Ros finds the contribution of privatization to the growth in teledensity to be statistically insignificant for countries
with a per-capita GDP below $10,000.
25 Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) provide  additional econometric evidence  of the impact of entry liberalization and
privatization on productivity,  prices, and quality of long distance and mobile services,  focusing on the 23 OECD
countries over the 1991-1997 period.  Their findings suggest a generally favorable impact of policy reforms on
productivity, quality, and prices in the trunk (domestic  long distance),  international,  and mobile segments.  It is not
clear, however,  to what degree these results apply to developing countries, most of which have had to implement
reforms in situations where telecommunications  networks  are poorly developed.penetration, mobile penetration and productivity, but the interaction of privatization and
competition is associated with higher penetration and productivity.  However,  a drawback of
using a hybrid index of competition is that one cannot disentangle the direct effect that
competition in each segment has on performance in that segment.
The model
We assume the following specification for our model:
i, t  a+u +  year  + C  it  r + Xi t .8 + pMA  ,  +e,,  i = 1,2,...., N; t = 1,2,....T,
where  yi,  t is the natural logarithm of our performance indicator, which is either teledensity or
mainlines per employee in country "i" at time "t".  The coefficient a is the constant term, while
,Ui is a country-specific dummy variable that is intended to capture time-invariant  country fixed
effects.  The parameter 8 is the coefficient on a time-trend, which captures the effect of
autonomous factors, including technological  progress.  The matrix of control variables is Ci t and
includes the GDP per capita and population (both in natural logs).  Our telecom policy variables
are represented  by Xi t  and include dummy variables for privatization,  competition, and the
existence of an independent regulator, with ,B  being the corresponding vector of coefficients. 26
The number of countries is N (86, in our case), and the number of time series observations,  T
(15,  in our case) per country.
We need to take into account the interplay between fixed and mobile networks.27 In particular,
we must allow for the fact that  fixed-line teledensity could be influenced by the spread of
mobile telephony.28 However,  we cannot simply include the mobile penetration rate as an
independent variable because this variable could be endogenous - i.e. mobile penetration could
in turn depend on fixed penetration.  We correct for this by using a two-stage estimation
procedure.  The vector Mj,  is the fitted value from a first stage regression of the natural log of (1
+ mobile subscribers per 100 people) on a time trend, country fixed effects, natural logs of per
capita GDP and population, and a dummy variable representing  competition in the mobile
segment.
26  The partial correlation matrix for different policy reforms is presented in appendix 3.
27  See appendix 6 for a simultaneous equation approach to the determination of fixed-line and mobile penetration.
Also see Jha and Majumdar (1999).
28 Positive network externalities  imply an increased incentive to acquire a fixed telephone when there is an
additional mobile user.  But for any one consumer,  the negative substitution effect implies a reduced incentive to
acquire  a fixed telephone when he already has a mobile line.  The net effect depends on the relative strengths  of
these two effects.
12In contrast to the previous literature referred to above, we allow for country-wise
heteroscedasticity,  i.e. - that the variance of the error term differs across countries.29 In addition,
we also account for the existence of first-order  autoregressive serial correlation in the errors, but
assume a common autocorrelation parameter across panels.  The latter assumption is justified by
the fact that the P's themselves do not vary across countries.30 The heteroscedasticity  and
autocorrelation corrections make the estimation far more efficient than an ordinary fixed effects
panel estimation.  We choose to estimate our model using Kmenta's cross-sectionally
heteroscedastic and time-wise autocorrelated  (CHTA) approach.3'  For more on our choice of
estimation technique, refer appendix 4.
Effects of  individual  reforms on performance
Table 1 presents the results of our first investigation on the effect of individual reforms on
mainline penetration and productivity.  The dependent variables are the number of mainlines per
100 inhabitants  and the number of mainlines per worker (both in natural logs).  As control
variables, we use GDP per capita and population (both in natural logs), and a linear time trend to
capture reductions in switching and network costs due to technological  progress. We expect
mainline penetration to be higher in developing countries with higher per-capita GDP, and lower
in developing countries with higher populations.
In the first model specification,  our policy proxies are a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
an incumbent has been partially or wholly privatized and zero otherwise and a dummy variable
that equals 1 if there is competition for local services and zero if local services are provided by a
monopoly.3 2
29 We did a preliminary examination for group-wise heteroscedasticity  using-the  likelihood ratio test. We first
estimated the model with only heteroscedasticity  and no autocorrelation using iterated GLS, then the same model
with neither heteroscedasticity,  nor autocorrelation,  and compared the likelihoods in both cases.  In models without
autocorrelation,  GLS estimates are equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates. A likelihood ratio test of the
variances  in the two models turned out a X 2(74) statistic of 848.71,  which strongly rejected the null hypothesis of no
group-wise  heteroscedasticity.  Economically,  the reason for the presence of heteroscedasticity is somewhat
unclear.  Why should the variance of shocks to mainlines differ across countries?  It could be because of differing
government  initiatives on mainline expansion under different regimes, so that countries with a more volatile political
environment,  or unstable and frequently changing  governments have a higher variance in the level of mainlines per
capita than others arising from differing government initiatives on mainline expansion.  Another hypothesis is that
the richer developing countries can more easily overcome natural and geographical  obstacles (for example terrain) in
laying down the network than poorer countries  can.  Countries also differ  in their impact to adapt to technology
shocks  and this could be an additional source for different variances across countries.
30 As Beck and Katz (1995)  admit, the assumption of a common autocorrelation parameter across panels is unlikely
to cause FGLS estimates to estimate variability inaccurately,  as it necessitates  the calculation of only one additional
unknown parameter (the autocorrelation  coefficient).
31  We cannot assume contemporaneous  correlations across panels as the estimation technique would require as many
time series observations as there are panels to satisfy matrix invertibility conditions during estimation. In our case,
we have only  15 time-series observations  per country for 86 countries.  Since we also abstain from modeling
country-specific correlation,  we are immune from the criticism by Beck and Katz (1995) regarding the inaccurate
computation of standard errors.
32 We also  ran regressions with a dummy variable for corporatization of the incumbent.  The coefficient  on this
variable was consistently insignificant.
13In Section III, we argued that privatization and the introduction of competition are likely to lead
to an increase  in labor productivity, and (less strongly)  an increase in the number of mainlines
(Hypotheses  1 and 2).  Our empirical estimates in column  1 of Table 1 suggest that both
privatization and competition significantly increase mainline penetration. 3The coefficients on
the privatization and competition dummy variables  are positively significant at 1% and 5%
levels, respectively.  The time trend and the natural  log of GDP have the expected signs and are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The mobile penetration rate is a positive and
significant determinant of mainline penetration.  One explanation for this positive relationship
may be that positive network externalities  work to increase the benefits of belonging to the fixed
network given the size of the mobile network.34 Our results with regard to labor productivity
(column 2 of Table  1) suggest that both privatization and competition siFnificantly boost
productivity,  with  all controls and the time trend working as expected.3
We also tested whether the effects of privatization and competition differ in the presence of an
independent regulator (Hypothesis 4).  Accordingly,  we interacted both dummy variables for
privatization and competition with a dummy variable that equals 1 if a separate regulatory
agency exists and zero otherwise.  As mentioned before, this is a crude measure of the quality of
regulation and the results should therefore be interpreted with due caution.  Table 2 (columns  1
and 4) presents  our estimated coefficient on the interaction terms.  As above, we find both
privatization and competition - confined to observations that exhibit a good regulatory
framework - to impact positively on teledensity and productivity.
Does the interaction  ofprivatization  and competition matter?
To capture the interdependence  between privatization and competition,  we estimate another
model that also includes a two-way interaction term.  As explained in Section III, we expect the
33  We also estimated a similar model replacing our privatization measure with  a dummy variable that takes the value
one if foreign equity participation  was observed and zero  otherwise.  The results are similar,  which is not surprising
given that most privatizations  take place through the sale of strategic equity to foreign investors.  Indeed, the partial
correlation between the privatization  and foreign equity dummy variables exceeds 0.8.
34  Li and Xu (2001) account for the mobile sector by including an aggregate measure of competition (that includes
both fixed and mobile competition) in the fixed line equation.  It should be pointed out that all of our results about
fixed line performance  are qualitatively robust to estimation without accounting for the presence of the mobile
network.
35  Our findings for labor productivity are  similar to the results of Ros (1999).  By contrast,  Ros finds that only
privatization exerts a significant  impact on mainline  penetration.  We ran a similar fixed effects OLS regression
using our data,  but confining ourselves to the years  1986-1995,  as in Ros'  specification.  We still found a
significantly positive impact of both competition and privatization.  The most plausible explanation for this result is
that our estimation  sample only consists of developing countries, where initial network conditions  were weaker and
subsequent growth faster.  By contrast,  most countries that introduced  competition in Ros'  estimation samples are
developed countries  that already had a well-developed telecommunications  network.  Moreover,  the different
findings may also be due to different control variables and different specifications of our policy proxies.
Jha and Majumdar (1999)  find that cellular diffusion positively influences  the productive  efficiency of the
telecommunications  sector through pecuniary and technical network externalities.  In the light of this finding,  we also
carried out estimations that account for mobile penetration  in the fixed-line  productivity regressions.  We find a
similar result (not reported) that mobile penetration has a positive  impact on fixed-line productivity.
14interaction of these two policy choices to impact positively on both mainline penetration and
labor productivity (Hypothesis  3).  Our findings with regard to teledensity (Table 2, column 2)
confirm this hypothesis:  the coefficients on privatization  and the interaction of privatization and
competition are both positive and statistically significant at the  1 and 5 percent levels
respectively.  Interestingly,  competition  is not statistically significant in this model.  This result
suggests that the beneficial effect of competition primarily occurs through its interaction with
privatization.  The same holds for labor productivity (Table 2, column 5): privatization and the
interaction of privatization and competition  are statistically significant, whereas competition is
not statistically significant.
We also tested for the effects of the interaction of privatization with mobile competition.  The
results are presented in column 3 of table2.  Here,  we found that the dummy variables for
privatization and fixed-line  competition were positive and statistically significant  at the 5% level.
The interaction of privatization with mobile competition was also positive and significant,  albeit
at the  10% level.  This result seems to suggest that mobile competition may well be a surrogate
for fixed-line competition.  See appendix 6 for an empirical analysis of the mobile  sector as well
as the interplay between the fixed and mobile sectors.
How large are the effects ofpolicy reform relative to autonomous increases?
In order to quantify the effects of "complete"  liberalization - defined as the introduction of
competition, privatization of the incumbent and the establishment of a separate regulator - we
estimated a model whereby our only policy variable is a dummny variable that equals 1 if all three
policies are  in place and zero otherwise (i.e.,  the three way interaction  term).36 We find this
variable to be highly  significant for both mainline penetration and productivity (Table 3).  The
estimated coefficients suggest that mainline penetration is 8 percent higher and productivity is 21
percent higher in years of complete reform compared to years of no or partial reform.
It is revealing to compare these magnitudes to the implied growth in teledensity and productivity
due to autonomous  factors, including technological  progress.  Our estimated coefficients on the
linear time trend, suggest autonomous increases of approximately  5 percent per annum in
mainline penetration and over 9 percent per annum in productivity.  Hence, our empirical
investigation  suggests that the effect of the policy reforms studied here was outweighed by the
improvements  attributable to autonomous factors, like technological progress.  It should be kept
in mind, however, that the time trend captures an average effect across all countries and we do
not consider how policy reforms influence the diffusion of telecommunications  technology.  The
latter is beyond the scope of this study and would require explicit data on the international
diffusion of telecommunications  technology.
Does the sequence of reform matter?
Having found evidence of the beneficial effects of privatization and competition and the
interaction of the two on performance,  we investigate the effects of the order in which the two
36  In  fact, since all countries  that have fully liberalized fixed telephony have also  liberalized their mobile segments,
the interaction term captures full liberalization  of both segments.
15are introduced.37 In other words, while we know that the interaction of privatization and
competition results in a significantly higher mainline penetration,  are the effects any different if
privatization takes place before the introduction of competition, or vice-versa?  As argued in
Section III, we expect mainline penetration to be higher if competition and privatization are
introduced at the same time, than if privation precedes the introduction of competition
(Hypothesis  5).  For labor productivity, we expect little difference in the effects of altemative
sequences of policy reforms.
We define simultaneous introduction of policies as those reforms where privatization and
competition were introduced within a one-year time period.  Since no country in our sample
introduced competition more than one year before privatizing the public operators, we, therefore,
do not observe a possible third sequence, where competition clearly precedes privatization.38
(However, we do observe countries that have introduced competition for local services, but as of
1999, had not privatized their state-owned operator.)
In order to test the effects of different sequences,  we constructed 4 dummy variables. First, the
"simultaneous  sequence" (hereafter,  SEQSINM)  is represented by a variable that takes the value  1
for the year in which both privatization and competition were simultaneously introduced as well
as all subsequent years, and zero otherwise.  Second the "privatization before competition
sequence" (hereafter, SEQPC)  is represented  by a variable that takes the value  1 for the year in
which competition was introduced after privatization as well as all subsequent years, and zero
otherwise. 39 Third, the "competition only"(hereafter,  SEQC) variable takes the value 1 for all
years in which only competition is observed, and zero otherwise.  Finally, the "privatization only"
(hereafter,  SEQP) variable takes the value  1 for all years in which only privatization is observed,
and zero otherwise.
Our estimation results on sequencing are presented  in Table 4.  As the first column shows, the
coefficient on SEQP (which represents  years where only privatization is observed) is significant,
whereas the coefficient on SEQC (which represents years where only competition is observed)  is
not. Hence, it would seem that years where privatization takes place without local competition
witness higher mainline penetration,  whereas we do not observe higher mainline penetration  in
years where local competition is introduced without privatization of the incumbent firm.
However, on looking at the completed sequences,  we find that the coefficients  on both SEQPC
and SEQSIM are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level (column  1).
Interestingly, the two coefficients  are significantly different from each other, with that on
SEQSIM being greater than the one on SEQPC.  This implies that mainline penetration  in years
37 Wallsten  (2002) considers the impact of the sequencing of privatization and regulation.  He finds that countries
that established  an independent regulator prior to privatization experienced better performance  in the
telecommunications  sector.
38 As an alternative, we created a variable that represented  a "competition  before privatization" sequence, allowing
for situations  in which competition was introduced before privatization,  even if the gap between the two was only a
few months.  The estimation results were similar to the ones presented here.  We chose the "simultaneous sequence"
characterization,  however, since it is unlikely that there are significant sequencing effects  from policies that are
introduced within a short time period of each other.
39 Refer Appendix 5 for a more detailed illustration of the construction of SEQSIM and SEQPC.
40 Ho: SEQSIM (.22) = SEQPC (.12); X 2 (1) = 3.70; Prob > x2 = .0544.
16following the simultaneous introduction of competition and privatization is significantly higher
than mainline penetration in years following the "privatization before competition"  sequence
(Hypothesis 5). See Figure 4 for an illustration of the effects of the two different sequences.
In order to better understand the impact of exclusivity periods that are often granted to newly
privatized incumbents, we re-estimated the above equation by introducing the interaction of
SEQP (privatization only) with mobile competition as an additional explanatory  variable (table
4, column 2). Interestingly, we found that SEQP, which was formerly significant, was not
significant anymore, while the interaction of SEQP with a dummy variable for mobile
competition was positive and significant.  As noted above, this result indicates that the presence
of mobile competition may serve as a surrogate for fixed line competition and mitigate any
negative effects that exclusivity periods may have on mainline penetration.41  Further,  the result
explained in the previous paragraph still holds in this estimation, with the coefficient on
SEQSIM (simultaneous introduction of both privatization and competition) being significantly
greater than that on SEQPC (privatization before competition).
In Table 4 (Column 3), we estimated the effects of alternative sequences of privatization and
competition,  given the prior existence of an autonomous regulator.42 The estimated coefficients
and significance levels are qualitatively similar to the results obtained earlier (Column  1), but an
important difference in this case is that the dummy variable capturing years in which only
competition is observed (SEQC) is now also statistically significant (in addition to SEQP),
suggesting a 'pro-competitive'  effect of independent regulation. The other difference here is that
the magnitudes of the coefficients  on SEQSIM and SEQPC is now greater, lending more
credence  to hypothesis 5.43
Finally, we also tested for the effect of different sequences on productivity (Table 4, Column 4).
The effect of each sequence was found to be positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent
level, but the coefficients  on the dummy variables representing the two,  sequences  were not
significantly different from each other.  It can be seen though, that productivity is significantly
higher in years where only privatization is observed, whereas the effect of competition (without
privatization)  is not statistically different from zero.  As above, interacting all policy variables
with our regulation dummy does not fundamentally change this result (Table 4, Column  5).
41  Wallsten (2000) finds that each year of exclusivity can reduce fixed network growth by as much as 0.4 percentage
points.  However, in  the presence of a competing network (i.e., mobile), we find that the effects of exclusivity are not
as drastic.
42 We took care to exclude those observations  where autonomous regulation was introduced only after privatization
and competition.  This led to the exclusion  of the Bahamas, Chile, the Dominican Republic,  and Surinam from the
regression  sample. Had observations on these countries been included, it  would have had the effect of the regulatory
variable disrupting a previously chosen sequence, and making it start afresh.
43 Ho:  SEQSIM (.24) = SEQPC (.07);  X 2(l) = 9.41; Prob > X2 = .0022
44 Ho:  SEQSIM (.39) = SEQPC (.29); x2(M)  = 1.95; Prob > x2 = .163
17V. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the impact of policy reform in basic telecommunications  on sectoral
performance  in 86 developing countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and the
Caribbean over the period  1985 to 1999.  While, most countries experienced substantial
increases in teledensity  and sectoral productivity - in part driven by fast technological  progress
in telecommunications  - the approach to policy reform has differed markedly across regions and
countries.  Most governments  have been unwilling to commit to complete liberalization
immediately,  preferring instead a gradual reform process,  encompassing the privatization of
state-owned operators, the introduction of competition, and the establishment  of independent
regulation.
The econometric  evidence presented in this study may provide some guidance on possible
priorities for telecommunications  reform.  First, we find that complete liberalization pays off.
Ceteris paribus, teldensity  is 8 percent higher and labor productivity 21 percent higher in years
that saw privatized incumbents, additional  competitors,  and separate regulators, compared to
years with no or only partial reform.  Second, both privatization and competition improve
performance  and the latter reinforces the former.  Third, sequences matter.  Introducing
competition after privatizing incumbent operators leads to fewer mainlines per population
compared to a simultaneous  introduction of the two policies.  This result suggests that delays in
the introduction of competition - for example due to market exclusivity guarantees granted to
newly privatized entities - may adversely affect performance even after competition is
eventually introduced.  Furthermore,  mobile competition can serve as a surrogate  for fixed-line
competition in achieving higher mainline penetration  and can thereby  mitigate the harmful
effects of exclusivity periods.
An interesting supplemental finding of the paper is that the impact of policy reforms have in the
past fifteen years been outweighed by the improvements  in telecommunications  performance not
directly attributable  to the policy variables  considered here.  According to our crude
quantification,  autonomous developments accounted for increases of 5 and 9 percent per annum
in teledensity and productivity respectively.  One possible explanation is the rapid pace of
technological  progress in telecommunications.  Another is the increased public investment in this
sector.  A richer exploration of these issues was beyond the scope of this paper, but is a priority
for future research.  Two questions seem particularly  important.  What kind of policies support
technological  diffusion?  What role does foreign investment play in transferring modern
telecommunications  technology  to developing countries?
More research is also necessary to verify and refine the other findings presented in this study.
Improved data would make it possible to analyze several issues that have not been addressed
here.  How much is to be gained from eliminating all barriers to entry when  some competition
has already been allowed?  How great are the gains from eliminating all barriers to foreign
investment when some is already permitted?  How significant are the benefits of making
commitments under regional and multilateral trade agreements with regard to present and future
policy?  It will become possible to respond to these questions when more detailed data become
available and more observations are available after the point in time when policy changes were
implemented and multilateral commitments took effect.
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21Table 1. Effects of individual reforms on mainline penetration and productivity
Natural  log of mainlines  Natural  log of  mainlines
Dependent variable  per 100 people  per employee
(1)  (2)
Time trend  .045***  .094***
(4.12)  (19.82)
Natural log ofper-  .314***  .189***
capita GDP  (8.85)  (4.07)
Natural  log of  -.132  -.594***
population  (-0.45)  (3.61)
Dummy variablefor  .073***  .176***
privatization  (4.42)  (7.68)
Dummy variablefor  .046**  .091***
competition  in basic  (2.52)  (3.24)
services
Natural log of  (l +  .449***
mobile penetration)  (4.30)
Wald Chi-squared  (k-l)  61,076  15,385.82
AR(1)  coefficient  .67  .54
Number of  Observations  1,200  1,085
Note: All specifications estimated by feasible  generalized least squares. "*",  "**" and "***"
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the  1% levels respectively.  The bracketed
figures are GLS corrected z-statistics.  Country fixed effects and the intercept are not reported.
22Table 2. Effects of combinations of reforms on mainline penetration and productivity
Natural  log of  mainlines  per 100  Natural  log of
people  mainlines  per  employee
Dependent variable
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Time trend  .05***  .046***  .051***  .10***  .09***
(4.46)  (4.17)  (4.42)  (20.33)  (19.99)
Natural logofper-capita  .319***  .308***  .312***  .21***  .18***
GDP  (8.90)  (8.59)  (8.79)  (4.46)  (3.97)
Natural  log ofpopulation  -.253  -.152  -.271  -.66***  -.60***
(-0.84)  (-0.51)  (-0.88)  (4.01)  (3.66)
Dummy  variablefor  .062***  .047**  .16***
privatization  (3.59)  (2.07)  (6.86)
Dummy variablefor  .003  .045**  .00004
competition in basic  (0.12)  (2.45)  (0.00)
services
Privatization  *competition  .076**  .15***
(2.40)  (2.99)
Privatization  *mobile  .042*
competition  (1.72)
Competition *regulation  .056***  .12***
(2.71)  (3.83)
Privatization  *regulation  .061***  .12***
(3.43)  (5.02)
Natural log of (l+ mobile  .412***  .445***  .394***
. penetration)  (3.88)  (4.24)  (3.60)
Wald Chi-squared(k-l)  61,259.29  61,959.38  61,628.89  15,225.99  15,528.57
AR(I) coefficient  .66  .66  .66  .54  .54
Number of Observations  1,200  1,200  1,200  1,085  1,085
Note: All specifications estimated by feasible generalized  least squares. "*", "**" and "***"
indicate statistical significance at the  10%, the 5%, and the 1%  levels respectively.  The bracketed
figures are the GLS corrected z-statistics. Country fixed effects and the intercept are not
reported.
23Table 3. Effects of  Full reform (vis-a-vis  partial or no reform) on mainline penetration and
productivity
Natural  log of mainlines  Natural  log of mainlines
Dependent variable  per 100 people  per employee
(1)  (2)
Time trend  .043***  .10***
(3.91)  (21.03)
Natural log of per-capita  .32***  .21***
GDP  (8.86)  (4.44)
Natural log of population  -.072  -.67***
(-0.24)  (4.10)
Dummy  variablefor  .075***  .19***




Natural  log of (I+ mobile  .50***
penetration)  (4.78)
Wald Chi-squared(k- 1)  59,851.18  15,270.15
AR(l) coefficient  .67  .54
Number of Observations  1,200  1,085
Note: All specifications estimated by feasible generalized least squares. "*", "**" and "***"
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels respectively.  The bracketed
figures are GLS corrected z-statistics.  Country fixed effects and the intercept are not reported.
24Table 4. Effects of  sequencing  of reform on mainline penetration and productivity
Natural log of mainlines  per 100  Natural  log of
people  mainlines  per worker
Dependent variable
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Time trend  .047***  .052***  .051***  09***  .10**
(4.28)  (4.62)  (4.60)  (19.89)  (20.51)
Natural logofper-capita  GDP  .311***  .31***  .329***  .19***  .20***
(8.64)  (8.61)  (9.27)  (4.04)  (4.36)
Natural  log ofpopulation  -. 182  -. 328  -.282  -.59***  -.64***
(-0.61)  (-1.07)  (-0.95)  (3.55)  (3.94)
Dummy  variableforprivatization  .057***  .031  .14***
only (SEQP)  (3.21)  (1.37)  (5.82)
SEQP* mobile competition  .046*
,_________  (1.90)
Dummy variable for competition  .045  .048  -.007
only (SEQC)  (1.50)  (1.59)  (.11)
Simultaneous introduction of  .221***  .227***  .39***
competition  & privatization  (4.31)  (4.43)  (6.17)
(SEQSIM))
Privatization before competition  .125***  .138***  .29***
sequence (SEQPC)  (4.27)  (4.59)  (7.10)
SEQP (in the presence of  an  .044**  .10***
independent regulator)  (2.38)  (4.12)
SEQC (in the presence of an  .084**  .01
independent regulator)  (2.54)  (.15)
SEQSIM (in the presence of  an  .241***  .38***
independent regulator)  (5.05)  (6.08)
SEQPC (in the presence of an  .075***  .25***
independent regulator)  (2.61)  (6.09)
Natural log of  (1+ mobile  .423***  .364***  .398***
penetration)  (4.01)  (3.31)  (3.77)
Wald Chi-squared(k-1)  61,424.43  61,925.59  62,459.88  15574.19  15583.57
AR(1)  coefficient  .66  .66  .66  .54  .54
Number of Observations  1,200  1,200  1,200  1,085  1,085
Note: All specifications estimated by feasible  generalized least squares. "*", "*"  and "
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the  1% levels respectively.  The bracketed
figures are the GLS corrected z-statistics. Country fixed effects and the intercept are not
reported.
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45 Note that the coefficients  on the dummy variables  representing different sequences  (SEQSIM & SEPC) do  not
measure instantaneous  "jumps"  in the lines. Rather,  they measure the extent to which mainline penetration  is higher
in years following the completion of the  respective  sequences, compared to years where  no reform had taken place.
The figure is too  simple to reflect the actual  dynamics  of teledensity  in response  to policy changes.
26Appendix  1: The ITU-World Bank Database on Telecommunications  Policy
The telecommunications  reform process is now old enough to have produced the data needed to
analyze the implications of alternative policy choices.  While the International
Telecommunications  Union (I.T.U.) has a comprehensive database on performance indicators,
there did not exist until now any worldwide database containing detailed time-series information
about telecommunications  policy.  The ITU and the World Bank have recently created a database
on telecommunications  policy and regulation.  The database spans 86 developing countries in
Africa, Asia and Latin America. 46
The policy data are drawn from a variety of sources, including responses by governments to an
ITU questionnaire,  information from World Bank programs in various developing countries,
World Bank Aid Memoirs, the Tradeport and International Trade Administration databases of
the U.S. Department of Commerce, www.cellular.co.za,  country reports of the Economist
Intelligence Unit (E.I.U.), and direct queries to national regulators and telecom operators across
the world. The data cover various aspects of policy and market structure in fixed line and mobile
telecommunications  including inter alia, information about corporatization of the incumbent
public telephone operator, the share of private equity, the share of foreign equity, the market
structure in local, domestic long distance, and international  services, mobile operators, and the
year an independent regulator was instituted.47
Assumptions made in the creation of the database  and sample selection
1. Observedpolicy  changes
Data on variables like private equity, competition,  are recorded based on observed private equity
shares, or observed entry and commencement  of services. There usually exists a substantial time
lag between the announcement of a policy and an observed result. For example, suppose a
government would like to introduce competition.  First, it has to pass a new law, which has to be
ratified by its parliament.  Decisions also need to be made on how many operators to admit, in
what regions, and so on. The auctioning of licenses, the bidding process for which takes time to
settle, follows this. Even after licenses are awarded, there still is a time lag before the licensee(s)
enter the market and effectively  commence service provision. We thought it best to consider a
market competitive  at the point at which a second operator begins providing basic services since
this is the least ambiguous  criterion.  For instance, using the date of issue of licenses as an
indicator of when competition began can be misleading as licenses are sometimes withdrawn or
revoked with a change of government.  Similar considerations arise  in the privatization of a state-
owned network operator, with a long time lag (at least 1-2 years) between the government's
announcement of its desire to privatize, and the completion of the sale of equity.
2. Timing ofpolicy changes
46 Liberia, Seychelles and Cuba had to be omitted for lack of GDP data. We also omitted some small island nations,
for example, Vanuatu and Western  Samoa, where country size is  a constraint on having more than one operator.
47 We obtained  part of the information on cellular operators and mobile competition in Latin America  from the
Stanford-World  Bank Database.  We have  supplemented this data to reflect the market structure in  both analogue and
digital mobile segments, and to cover years until  1999.  For Africa,  detailed information on cellular operators was
obtained from the African  Telecommunications  Research Project at the World Bank.
27The panel data is on an annual basis but is sometimes difficult to assign a particular policy to a
particular year. For example, if the second operator in Nigeria only commenced  services in
November of 1996, then we took the starting year of effective  competition as  1997, and not
1996. As a rule, any entry relatively late in a given year was taken as effective from the
following year. This approach seemed appropriate because our main concern was to link policy
changes in a particular year to the performance  variables compiled by the ITU.  Similarly, if the
sale of a public enterprise was completed relatively late in the year, we record the privatization
as effective from the following calendar year.
3. Entry and  geographical  market segmentation
Sometimes,  a country has more than one telephone  operator, but each has a monopoly in its
respective regions. For example, Bangladesh has two basic network operators - the incumbent
Bangladesh Telephone and Telegraph Board (BTTB), which provides services in the urban areas,
and the Bangladesh Rural Telephone Authority (BRTA), licensed in 1990, which provides basic
services in rural areas. Similarly, in Argentina, ENTel was separated into two companies in
1990, Telecom Argentina, which provides services in the north, and Telefonica de Argentina in
the south. Since the markets are geographically  segmented,  we deemed it appropriate  to consider
each country as having a monopoly in basic services.
4. Privatization  in limited segments
In some cases, the domestic long distance or the international long distance segment is separated
from the local services segment and then privatized.  In this study, only privatization of local
service providers was taken into account.
Country coverage
Region  No. of  List of countries
countries
Asia  12  Bangladesh, China, Indonesia,  India,  Cambodia, Sri Lanka,
Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam
Sub-Saharan  39  Angola, Burundi,  Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana,  C.A.R., Cote
Africa (SSA)  d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo, Rep., Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana,  Guinea, Rep., Gambia, Equatorial  Guinea, Kenya,  Liberia,
Lesotho, Madagascar,  Mali, Mozambique,  Mauritius, Malawi,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,  Sierra Leone, Swaziland,
Seychelles,  Chad, Togo,  Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa,  Zaire,
Zambia and Zimbabwe
Middle East and  10  Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,  Morocco,  Oman, Saudi Arabia,
North Africa  Syria, Tunisia and U.A.E.
(MENA)
Latin America and  25  Argentina, Bahamnas,  Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Chile,
the Caribbean  Colombia,  Costa Rica,  Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
(LAC)  Guatemala,  Guyana, Honduras, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua,
Panama,  Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Suriname, Uruguay and
Venezuela
28Appendix 2. Review  of empirical literature on fixed-line  telecommunications  policy  and performance
Study  Objective  Time period,  Estimation  Results  Strengths  Problems with analysis
regional focus  technique
and sample
Walisten  To explore the effects of  30 African and  Ordinary fixed  1. Competition significantly  1. Analyzes the  l.  Weak measure of
(1999)  privatization, competition  Latin American  effects panel  correlated with increased mainline  costs associated  competition - i.e., the use
and regulation on  countries  from  estimation.  penetration,  connection capacity,  with granting a  of the number of mobile
mainline penetration,  1984-'97.  payphone penetration, and a decrease  privatized  operators  not owned by
payphone penetration,  in local calling prices.  incumbent an  the incumbent, captures
connection  capacity and  exclusivity period.  spurious correlation.
local call prices.  2. Privatizing an incumbent
negatively correlated  with mainline  2. No correction  for
penetration and connection capacity.  complications  in the panel
error structure.
3.  Interaction of  privatization and
regulation positively correlated  with
connection capacity and mitigates
negative effect of privatization  on
mainline penetration.
Ros  To examine the effects of  110 countries  Ordinary fixed  1. Countries with majority privatized  1.  Use instrumental  1. Sample period does not
(1999)  privatization and  (including  effects,  and fixed  PTO have higher mainline  variables to correct  include developing
competition on network  developed  effects with  penetration, and to a lesser degree,  a  for endogeneity.  country liberalization of
expansion and efficiency.  countries),  1986-  Instrumental  higher growth in mainline  the late 1990s.
'95.  variable  penetration.  2. Large  sample
correction.  makes fixed effects  2. Competition measure
2. No evidence of privatization  appropriate.  includes long distance and
leading to higher growth of mainline  international  competition
penetration in countries with annual
per-capita income below $10,000.  3. Ignores the effect of an
independent regulator.
4. No corrections  for
complications  in panel
error structure.
Boylaud  To investigate the effects  23 O.E.C.D  Fixed effects,  1.  The prospect of competition  1.  Exhaustive  study  1. No analysis of
29and  of entry liberalization and  countries  from  robust  (measured by time remaining until  of OECD.  developing countries.
Nicoletti  privatization on  1991-'97.  regressions and  liberalization)  has  a strong positive  countries
(2000)  productivity, prices and  random  effects.  effect on productivity,  quality of  regulatory system  2. Do not correct for
quality of service in long-  services and a strong negative effect  and reform  complications  in panel
distance (domestic and  on prices.  agendas.  error structure.
international)  and mobile




Fink et. al.  To ascertain the impact of  12 East and  Ordinary fixed  1. Interaction  of  privatization and  1. Useful evidence  1. Sample too small to
(2001)  privatization,  competition  South Asian  effects panel  competition significantly increases  that policy  make inferences about
and regulation on  economies from  estimation.  mainline penetration.  interactions matter,  other developing
mainline penetration,  1985-'99.  rather than  countries.
network quality, and  2. Countries that privatize,  introduce  individual policy
productivity.  competition and establish and  effects.  2. No corrections for
independent  regulator see much  complications in panel
higher levels of  mainline penetration,  error structure.
network digitalization and
______________  productivity than others.  _
Wei et. al.  To explore the  160 Countries on  Ordinary fixed  1. In a no interactions  model,  1. Explores the  1. Use of information on
(2001)  relationship  between  privatization  &  effects  privatization  is significantly  effects of policy  mobile competition  in
privatization, competition,  40 Countries on  positively  associated  with mainline  reforms on a wide  measuring fixed-line
regulatory autonomy, and  competition over  penetration.  variety of  competition makes it hard
interconnection  policies  the  1990s  performance  to disentangle the effects
on fixed and mobile  2.  In model with interactions,  only  indicators.  of each on performance.
capacity,  profitability, and  the interaction  of privatization and
local calling prices.  competition has a significant  2. No corrections  for
influence on mainline penetration.  complications  in panel
error structure.
3. Autonomous  regulator has a
negative impact, and competition no
impact on mainline penetration.  The
interaction of competition and
interconnection  has a strongly
negative  impact on mainline
I penetration.
30Appendix 3. Partial correlations between various reforms
Variable  P  C  R  P*C  C*R  P*R  P*Cm  P*C*R
P  1.00
C  0.29  1.00
(.00)  (.00)
R  0.28  0.22  1.00
(.00)  (.00)  (.00)
P*C  0.36  0.86  0.18  1.00
(.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)
C*R  0.24  0.74  0.31  0.69  1.00
(.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)
P*R  0.60  0.27  0.62  0.33  0.39  1.00
(.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)
P*Cm  0.60  0.44  0.41  0.52  0.41  0.70  1.00
____________________(.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  _________
P*C*R4 "  0.28  0.67  0.28  0.78  0.90  0.45  0.47  1.00
(.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)
Note: Numbers  in brackets indicate p-values
KEY: P = privatization  of fixed line incumbent,
C = competition in local services,
R= independent regulator,
Cm = competition in mobile services.
48 Since in our sample, every country that had fully liberalized the fixed line sector had also introduced mobile competition, P*C*R is equivalent to P*C*R*Cm,
i.e.,  full liberalization of both fixed  line and mobile segrnents.
31Appendix 4:  Our choice  of estimation technique
Estimating  a  model  containing  time-series  cross-section  (TSCS)  data  typically  implies  a
complicated  regression  error structure  that involves  serial  and/or  contemporaneous  correlation,
and  heteroscedasticity. 49 Models  that  feature  these  kinds  of non-spherical  disturbances  are
usually  estimated  by  feasible  generalized  least  squares  (FGLS).50 A  model  that  involves
contemporaneous  error correlations,  serial  error  correlation,  and group-level  heteroscedasticity,
is estimated  by researchers  using Park's FGLS method.  It is worth noting  the criticism of Beck
and  Katz (1995)  on panel  data estimation by the Park's FGLS  method.  Beck and Katz propose
using OLS panel corrected standard errors  (PCSE) estimation,  rather than GLS. Based on Monte
Carlo  simulations,  they  infer that  GLS  estimates  that  correct for  contemporaneous  correlation
and  panel-specific  serial  correlation  produce  standard  errors  that  lead  to  extreme  over-
51  52 confidence, often underestimating  variability by 50% or more.  ,
A second genre of TSCS models features errors that are serially correlated, and group-wise
heteroscedastic, but not contemporaneously correlated.  These models are typically estimated
using Kmenta's cross-sectionally heteroscedastic  and time-wise autocorrelated (CHTA)
technique,  which is also an FGLS procedure.  CHTA first transforms the data to eliminate serial
correlation in the errors, and then transforms the transformed data to correct for group-wise
heteroscedasticity  using panel weighted least squares (PWLS). Using Monte  Carlo evidence,
Beck and Katz (1996) critique this approach saying that, although CHTA does not produce
dramatically incorrect estimates or standard errors, its PWLS component is no more efficient
than OLS, and further, that it is better to model dynamics using a lagged dependent variable,
rather than an autoregressive process for the error.
We choose to estimate our model using Kmenta's CHTA approach assuming a common
autocorrelation parameter across  countries. Since we assume neither contemporaneous
correlations, nor country-specific  serial correlation, we are immune from criticisms regarding the
49 The term "time-series cross-section  data" is  used differently from "panel data". The latter typically  has a few
repeated observations on a large number of sampled units.  We use the terms "panel", "group", and "country"
interchangeably.  For a good exposition on panel data analysis, refer Hsiao (1986) & Baltagi (1995).
50 Essentially,  a feasible generalized least squares procedure  first estimates the model by ordinary least squares
(OLS), and uses the OLS residuals to estimate serial correlations, if any, in the error. These estimated serial
correlations are then used to transform the model into one with serially independent errors. The transformed model
is then estimated by OLS, and the residuals  from this are used to estimate  the error variance-covariance  matrix that
contains the estimated  contemporaneous  correlations.  The estimated contemporaneous  error correlations and
variances are then used to transform the model yet again into one with no contemporaneous  correlations and no
heteroscedasticity,  which can be easily and accurately  estimated by OLS.
51  If group specific autocorrelation (modeled by a first order autoregressive process (ARI)) processes  are assumed,
then the necessary  computation of N extra autocorrelation coefficients (one for each of the N groups), based on only
T time series observations per group, is likely to cause more serious underestimations  of variability.  It is widely
accepted that autoregressive parameters  estimated in samples of 30 or less time-series observations are inaccurate
and downward biased.  See, for example, Nickell (1981).
52  Suppose there are T time-series observations  in each of the N panels/groups.  Each element of the matrix of
contemporaneous  covariances  is estimated, on average, using 2T/N observations.  If the ratio of T/N is close to 1,
then contemporaneous  covariances  are calculated using about 2 observations,  which is problematic as their accuracy
would be highly questionable.
32inaccurate computation of standard errors mentioned earlier.53 While we could have used a
lagged dependent variable, which Beck and Katz suggest is a better way to capture dynamics, its
estimation typically requires the use of instruments, if there is serial correlation in the error.
Kiviet (1995) has shown that estimation of dynamic panel data models using instrumental
variables leads to poor finite sample efficiency. Moreover, it is hard to find good instruments.54
53  We do not assume contemporaneous correlations across panels as the estimation technique  would require as many
time series observations as there are panels to satisfy matrix invertibility conditions during estimation.  In our case,
we have only  15 time-series  observations per country for 86 countries.
54 Another interesting  estimation technique that we could potentially have used is the Arellano-Bond (1991)
procedure  for dynamic panel data estimation (or panel estimation with a lagged dependent variable) as it could help
account for any endogeneity  in the explanatory variables.  This technique  uses a Generalized Method of Moments
estimation procedure  and features variables in first differences  with lagged values of explanatory variables acting as
instruments.  However, lagged values make good instruments only if there is no second-order  serial correlation  in the
error term of the first differenced regression.
33Appendix 5. Construction of sequencing  dummy variables
Below is an illustration of the construction of the sequencing dummies for Malaysia and Sri
Lanka.  Malaysia privatized its incumbent Telkom Malaysia in 1990. Competition in basic
services was only introduced  in 1996, so that Malaysia followed the "privatization before
competition" sequence.  On the other hand, Sri Lanka introduced competition in  1996, but
privatized only in  1997, so that Sri Lanka followed the "simultaneous" sequence.
Country  Year  Only  Only  Simultaneous  Privatization
competition  privatization  sequence  before
observed  observed  (SEQSIM)  competition
(SEQC)"  (SEQP)  sequence
(SEQPC)
Malaysia  1985  0  0  0  0
Malaysia  1986  0  0  0  0
Malaysia  1987  0  0  0  0
Malaysia  1988  0  0  0  0
Malaysia  1989  0  0  0  0
Malaysia  1990  0  1  0  0
Malaysia  1991  0  1  0  0
Malaysia  1992  0  1  0  0
Malaysia  1993  0  1  0  0
Malaysia  1994  0  1  0  0
Malaysia  1995  0  1  0  0
Malaysia  1996  0  0  0  1
Malaysia  1997  0  0  0
Malaysia  1998  0  0  0  1
Malaysia  1999  0  0  0  1
SriLanka  1985  0  0  0  0
SriLanka  1986  0  0  0  0
Sri Lanka  1987  0  0  0  0
SriLanka  1988  0  0  0  0
Sri Lanka  1989  0  0  0  0
Sri Lanka  1990  0  0  0  0
SriLanka  1991  0  0  0  0
Sri Lanka  1992  0  0  0  0
Sri Lanka  1993  0  0  0  0
Sri Lanka  1994  0  0  0  0
SriLanka  1995  0  0  0  0
Sri Lanka  1996  0  0  0  0
Sri Lanka  1997  0  0  1  0
SriLanka  1998  0  0  1  0
Sri Lanka  1999  0  0  1  0
55 Note that SEQC (years  where only competition is observed)  does not take the value I for Sri Lanka in the year
1996. This is due to the fact that we have taken the introduction  of competition and privatization to be simultaneous
(as the two were introduced only a year apart).  The variable  SEQC takes the value I only for those countries who
have only introduced competition without privatizing the incumbent.
34Appendix 6: Effect of policy  reforms in the mobile sector
We estimated another set of equations  for the mobile segment with the mobile penetration rate,
measured by the number of mobile subscribers  per 100 of the population, as the dependent
variable.  We used controls and explanatory variables along the lines of Gruber & Verboven
(2001 a & b), Barros and Cadima (2000), Xu & Li (2001), and Gebrebab (2002).  Using a similar
model and estimation technique  as the one introduced earlier for fixed line penetration (fixed
effects, autonomous time trend and country controls estimated by FGLS), we find that mobile
competition is a positive and highly significant determinant of mobile penetration.56 This result
is in line with the findings of the aforementioned  authors. The effect of mobile competition has
been to drastically reduce the price of handsets and mobile calling prices thereby contributing to
a large increase in subscribers.
On running separate regressions for the analogue and digital segments, we find that analogue and
digital mobile competition are positive and significant determinants of analogue  and digital
mobile penetration respectively. Not surprisingly, the introduction of digital technology, which
substantially increased spectrum capacity, seems to have reduced the analogue mobile phone
penetration rate. These results are presented in table 5 below.  Surprisingly, there is no robust
relationship between mobile penetration and the log of GDP, which is in line with the findings of
Gebrebab (2002) and Barros and Cadima (2000)."
Table 5: Effects  of policy  reforms on mobile penetration
Dependent variable  Ln(mobile  Ln(Analogue  Ln(Digital  mobile
Subscribers  per  mobile subscribers  subscribers  per 100
100people)  per 100 people)  people)
Time trend  .026***  .25*  .238*
.(2.86)  (1.83)  (1.77)
Natural log of per-capita GDP  -.859**  2.15***  .945
(-2.31)  (3.98)  (1.14)
Natural  log of population  -.30  -2.81  1.468
(-0.21)  (-1.33)  (0.47)
Dummy  variable for mobile competition  .537***
(8.78) 
Dummy  variable for competition in the analogue  65***
segment  (5.95)
Dummy  variablefor conpetition in the digital  .576***
mobile segment  (6.90)
Dummy variable  for the introduction of  digital  .058  -.138*
technology  (0.87)  (-1.66)
Natural  log of mainline  penetration  3.62***  1.045  5.835***
(3.87)  (0.72)  (4.84)
AR(I) coefficient  .35  .41  -.03
Number of Observations  531  408  195
56  The results for the mobile segment are robust to using a variety of estimation techniques  such as ordinary fixed
effects,  random effects,  and OLS with panel corrected standard errors.
57 We attribute the insignificance of per capita GDP to its high degree of correlation  with the fixed line teledensity of
almost 0.9.  When the fixed line teledensity is excluded, the natural log of per capita GDP is significant.
35In all the mobile regressions, the fixed line penetration rate exerts a positive and statistically
significant influence on the mobile penetration rate. Gebrebab (2002) and Gruber & Verboven
(2001 a) find the same result without correcting for the endogeneity of the fixed network. The
latter interpret this finding to mean that mobile and fixed phones are complements for one
another (also see Jha and Majumdar (1999) for a conceptual discussion). We address this issue
empirically in the next sub section.
Interdependence between fixed and  mobile segments
An interesting question has to do with the impact that higher penetration in the fixed (mobile)
sector has on penetration in the mobile (fixed) sector.  The interdependence between the fixed
line and mobile sectors is best studied by using a simultaneous equation approach.  We find that
there exists a positive relationship between fixed and mobile penetration in levels.58 This seems
to suggest that network externalities seem to enhance the benefits of belonging to either network
given the size of the other. This result is in line with Gruber and Verboven  (2001 a), but differs
from the finding of Barros and Cadima (2000). The latter find that a unit increase in mobile
penetration leads to a  10% decline in the fixed line teledensity of Portugal. Our result is robust to
estimation by 3SLS, or the Baltagi-Chang  instrumental variables method and is presented in
column  1 below.
Table 6: Interdependence between  fixed  and mobile  segments
Fixed line equation  (1)  Levels on levels  (2) Growth Rate on levels
Natural log ofper-capita  GDP  .345***  .076***
(9.76)  (4.50)
Natural log ofpopulation  -.114  .041
(-0.40)  (1.44)
Dummy variable  for  .067***  .037***
privatization  (4.05)  (4.40)
Dummy variable  for  .037**  -.036***
competition in basic services  (2.00)  (-3.21)
Natural log of  mobile  .474***  -.007
subscribers  per 100  (4.57)  (-0.44)
Mobile penetration equation
Natural log ofper-capita GDP  -.975***  .062
(-2.65)  (0.35)
Natural  log ofpopulation  -.495  .519***
(-0.35)  (2.39)
Dummy variablefor  mobile  .648***  .137**
competition  (19.87)  (2.44)
Dummy variable  for the  .047  .07
introduction of  digital  (0.72)  (1.41)
technology
Natural  log of mainlines per  3.428***  -.655***
100  (3.66)  (4.52)
58 The estimated coefficients (elasticities) suggest that a 1% increase  in mobile penetration is associated  with a .47%
increase in fixed-line penetration,  while a 1% increase in the latter corresponds to a 3.4%  increase  in mobile
penetration.  We do not report the time trend, the constant and the country fixed effects.
36Column 2 of table 6 presents estimates from equations where growth rates are regressed on
levels.  When we regress the first difference of the natural log of mainlines (which is equivalent
to the growth rate) on the level of mobile penetration, we find that the latter does not exert a
significant influence on the former. Interestingly,  when we regress the first difference of the
natural log of mobile subscribers (which is equivalent to the growth rate of mobile subscribers)
on the level of mainline penetration, we find that mobile growth is lower in countries with a
higher fixed line penetration. This is similar to the finding of Gruber and Verboven (2001b) that
a higher fixed network has a negative impact on the speed of mobile diffusion.
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